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Abstract
Police mobilization is a first step in the judicial process and an important source of
information on offending. Whether victims mobilize police is affected by their assessment of
its utility. Victims who are criminals, such as drug dealers, are known to face a different costbenefit scenario than law-abiding persons. Dutch ‘coffeeshops’ are a unique type of dealer.
They operate in a grey area, allowed by the government to sell a prohibited drug, cannabis, so
long as they comply with a set of regulations. Little is known about their mobilization of
police in response to victimization, including how it is affected by the rules governing their
business. We explore this issue with qualitative data collected from personnel of 50
coffeeshops in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. We analyze how they think about the potential
benefits and costs of asking the police for help post victimization. In many ways, their thought
process is similar to that of most any victim, but they also consider the potential negative
ramifications of inviting police to their door. We conclude by discussing the implications for
future research, regulation and drug control broadly, and coffeeshops specifically.
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A first link in the judicial chain is victim’s mobilization of police. For government
authorities, not to mention researchers, unreported victimization is a knowledge problem
(Biderman and Reiss 1967; Coleman and Moynihan 1996; Gill 2002). When people withhold
such information, the actual extent of offending is masked (i.e., the dark figure of crime
increases), which impedes optimal allocation of police resources. Most research on
mobilization is quantitative and focuses on victims’ characteristics, their relationship to
offenders, or differences across countries (Avakame et al. 1999; Baumer 2002; Felson et al.
1999, 2002; Goudriaan et al. 2004). Research less often looks at rationality through a
qualitative lens. Perhaps the richest body of such work is that on victimized drug dealers.
In this article, we explore the rationality of police mobilization by a particular sort of
drug dealer: personnel of cannabis-selling coffeeshops. This is a unique group with which to
examine the substantive issues, owing to their business being semi-illegal and highly
regulated. Our goal is to shed light on how personnel think about mobilizing law, in terms of
benefits and costs, with an eye to how this is shaped by Dutch coffeeshop policy. We do so by
analyzing qualitative data from interviews with personnel (owners and employees) of 50
coffeeshops located in and around the Red Light District of Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Our
findings demonstrate the unintended consequences of place-based regulatory policies,
informing the worldwide shift from cannabis prohibition to decriminalization and legalization.

Mobilization of Police by Victimized Drug Dealers
Mobilization is ‘the process by which a legal system acquires its cases’ (Black and
Mileski 1973, p. 6; Black 1980). Much has been learned about it by focusing on victimized
drug dealers.1 This is because, on the one hand, dealers should be afforded protection under
the law, but, on the other hand, the illegality of their business puts them in a precarious
position to request legal assistance (Jacques and Allen 2015; Jacques and Wright 2013).
Indeed, that position makes them an attractive target to would-be robbers, defrauders,
burglars, and other predators (Jacobs 1999, 2000; Wright and Decker 1994, 1997).
The rationality perspective provides one way to analyze and understand dealers’
responses to victimization. The theory is that actors weigh the potential benefits and costs of
various lines of action, and choose whichever has the greatest payoff or, at least, the lowest
loss (Bentham 1970). By extension, people’s responses to victimization should be affected by

As used herein, the term ‘drug dealer’ – or ‘dealer’ for short – refers to someone who sells psychoactive
substances used for recreation (see Zimring and Hawkins 1992). Like many roles, that of the dealer is filled by
many types of people and found across many times and places (Coomber 2006).
1

their assessment of how the possibilities compare in utility (i.e., benefits minus costs). Thus, a
victim should be more likely to mobilize when it is perceived to have greater benefit or less
cost, but, if deemed to have less utility than informal alternatives, should not occur. Informal
routes are retaliation, negotiation, avoidance, gossip, and toleration (among dealers, see,
Dickinson 2015; Jacques and Wright 2011, 2015; Jacques et al. 2016; Jacobs and Wright
2006; more generally, see, e.g., Anderson 1999; Black 1998; Cooney 2009).
Many of the factors that weigh on victimized dealers’ decisions (not) to mobilize
police are also considered by law-abiding victims. Both types of victims consider how much
time, effort, and other resources may be incurred to mobilize police. These costs stem from
contacting police, waiting for them to investigate, providing information, perhaps going to the
police station, and filling out forms. If police arrest and charge a suspect, the victim may then
be compelled to attend court to provide testimony (Tarling and Morris 2010).
Whether those costs are ‘worth it’ depends on the potential concrete benefits, such as
recovering lost property, and abstract rewards, like pleasure in justice (Tarling and Morris
2010). Tied to that, most anyone will consider whether the police are unwilling or unable to
pursue the matter and accordingly adjust the utility of involving them. Relevant evaluations in
that regard are the crime’s seriousness and a victim’s self-blaming (Baumer 2002;
Gottfredson and Hindelang 1979; Goudriaan et al. 2004).
There are unique factors that enter victimized dealers’ cost/benefit assessment of
police mobilization. Unlike law-abiding persons, dealers may consider whether the police
know them to be criminals and, therefore, undeserving of help (Jacques and Wright 2013;
from the perspective of police, see, e.g., Klinger 1997; Moskos 2008). Furthermore, dealers
may worry that requesting police assistance will bring (further) attention to their own crimes,
leading to unwanted surveillance, investigation, and punishment. Whether contraband is
involved has an effect, too (Copes et al. 2011; Jacques and Wright 2013; Mohamed and
Fritsvold 2010; Jacobs 2000). For example, a dealer who is robbed of €1,000 in cash may
have a plausible way to involve the police and recover the money, but that is not true if the
stolen item is a fully prohibited drug, such as cocaine or heroin.

Dutch Coffeeshop Policy
In the 1970s, the Netherlands introduced a regulatory regime for narcotic drugs that
distinguishes less harmful, or ‘soft’, drugs from unacceptably harmful, or ‘hard’, drugs
(Spapen et al. 2015). Cannabis was categorized as a soft drug. To prevent cannabis users from
gaining connections to hard drug dealers, the Dutch government allows so-called

‘coffeeshops’ to sell cannabis. This type of retail business is formally illegal but allowed, so
long as purveyors adhere to a set of conditions stipulated in the revised Opium Act of 1976
and since expanded; they are outlined below (MacCoun 2011; Monshouwer et al. 2011). In
this sense, coffeeshops occupy a ‘grey area’: The law is not black and white with respect to
their activities. All the more so because though coffeeshops are allowed to make cannabis
sales, it is de jure and de facto illegal for them to purchase stock for trade.
In exchange for formal permission to break the law on cannabis distribution, the
government requires coffeeshops to follow a set of strictly enforced rules, or regulations. At
any given establishment, the Dutch policy prohibits the presence of hard drugs, persons under
18 years of age, or more than 500 grams of cannabis. Nor may a coffeeshop sell more than 5
grams to an individual in a day, advertise, or be a source of nuisance. Failure to comply with
the rules can result in short-term, long-term, or permanent closure, as well as criminal
prosecution if warranted (Spapen et al. 2015).
The Dutch policy takes a proactive approach to seeking out rule violations at
coffeeshops. As one worker explained: ‘You [have to] agree to let the police in the door
whenever they come. … We have far more checks on our business than any other sort of
business in the country. We have police checking for all sort of stipulations they can shut us
down for’ (Jacques 2019, p. 2). Annually at each coffeeshop, police are required to conduct at
least two unannounced visits to check for compliance. The number of site-visits can be more,
as to do otherwise would allow personnel to relax control. Across the 50 coffeeshops
examined in this article (described in ‘The Present Study’ section), there were about 2.5
surprise checks at each, on average. For some coffeeshops, this in-establishment surveillance
is a monthly occurrence (for details, see Jacques 2019).
The Dutch coffeeshop policy is an example of a place-based enforced, self-regulation
policy (Graham and Homel 2008). Regulation, in this context, is defined as ‘allowing the
controlled supply of the product or service by licensed operators’ (Spapen et al. 2015). The
aim of regulating retail cannabis sales is to prevent the negative externalities of crime and
disorder by motivating coffeeshop personnel to internalize the costs of those problems (see
Eck and Eck 2012). In other words, the government indirectly controls behavior at
coffeeshops by motivating personnel to exercise informal control. Police take on a ‘quasienforcement and managerial role’ (Buerger and Mazerolle 1998, p. 302), with personnel
forced into playing the role of police officer.
That indirect control is achieved by threatening coffeeshops with punishment for
violations, and increasing the certainty of detection through surprise police checks. The goal

is partly deterrence: scare personnel out of acting in prohibited ways, such as advertising,
selling more than 5 grams to a person in a day, or having more than 500 grams on the
premise. Also, the goal is what Jacques (2019) terms proterrence: scare personnel into
stopping non-personnel from committing prohibited acts. This effect is created by holding
coffeeshops responsible for violations by other persons, like bringing hard drugs onto the
premises, entering the establishment underage, or starting a fight – a type of nuisance.
Dutch coffeeshop policy has been largely successful at achieving its goals. It separates
the markets for hard and soft drugs, without increasing the latter’s consumption, with a
greater net benefit – financially, morally, and with respect to public health – than prohibition
(MacCoun 2011; Monshouwer et al. 2011; Reinarman 2009; Wouters and Korf 2009;
Wouters et al. 2012). Yet the policy is not without problems, some better known than others
(see Jacques 2019). Perhaps the best example is that Dutch coffeeshops attract international
drug trafficking. Especially in the past, but surely still today, people living in neighboring
countries will go the Netherlands, buy cannabis, and illegally bring it home (Advisory
Committee on Drugs Policy 2009). Other problems are less established.

Mobilization of Police by Victimized Coffeeshops
Potentially, the rules governing coffeeshops may negatively affect personnel’s
mobilization of police in response to victimization. Scholars have recognized that enforced
self-regulation policies may have unintended negative consequences, including on victims’
mobilization of police (Gill 2002; Eck 2010, 2017; Freilich and Newman 2018). As reviewed
above, coffeeshop personnel have a vested interest in, one, abiding by the rules and, two not
increasing police officers’ opportunity to detect violations. Otherwise, they risk short-term or
permanent closure and, in the extreme, criminal prosecution. Therefore, and like dealers of
fully prohibited substances, victimized coffeeshops may see it as a risk to mobilize police.
The literature is largely quiet on that possibility and, more broadly, how personnel
decide to mobilize police. The most pertinent study is that of Jacques and colleagues (2016).
They found that in response to victimization, coffeeshops’ rate of police mobilization was
greater than that of street dealers, but equal to that of bars/cafés/pubs. Thus, they found mixed
support for the theory that when victimized, dealers’ mobilization of police varies inversely
with the illegality of the drug sold (Goldstein 1985). That article left much unexamined and
unexplained – voids we fill herein. Its limitations include no qualitative analysis bearing on
why personnel responded as they did to victimization.

The Present Study
In this study, we analyze personnel’s explanations of why they chose (not) to mobilize
police when victimized. We focus on victimizations in the de jure illegal but de facto legal
part of coffeeshop business; that is, the retail sale of cannabis to customers on the premises.
As with dealers of fully prohibited drugs, coffeeshop personnel have the right to formal
protection and justice. Yet, the policy that governs their business may lead them to think it is
better not to mobilize police when victimized. At the same time, other considerations may
take equal or more precedence: The time, effort, and other resources required to seek formal
justice; the potential to obtain concrete and abstract benefits; the crime’s seriousness; and,
victim culpability.

Data and Methods
The second-author, henceforth ‘the fieldworker,’ collected qualitative data by
interviewing personnel (i.e., owners and employees) of 50 coffeeshops. The coffeeshops were
in and around Amsterdam’s Red Light District, an area about one square mile in size. It is a
tourism spot because of its history, architecture, and, not least, deviant attractions;
coffeeshops are one.2 In fall 2008, the fieldworker made a population list of the area’s
coffeeshops. He did so by recording their names and addresses while walking every street. To
ensure the list’s accuracy and completeness, he compared it to results on Google Maps and
the Amsterdam Coffee Shop Directory (coffeeshop.freeuk.com/Map.html). That process led
to a population list of 84 coffeeshops.
Interviews and observations were conducted in Amsterdam from September 2008 to
May 2010, with follow-up visits in the summers of 2011 and 2016. Before recruiting an
establishment’s personnel to give an interview, he mailed them a letter describing the study
and requesting participation; one side was written in English, the other in Dutch. Next, he
visited each business to request involvement in the study. The aim was to interview the
highest-ranking representative possible. To serve as a participant, a person must have owned
or worked at the establishment for at least 6 months. Upon meeting a potential participant, the
fieldwork introduced himself, provided his business card, and briefly outlined the study’s
purpose and methods, including that respondents would be remunerated with €50.
Among personnel who agreed to participate, 64% are male; 34 is the average age; 10%
were married; 26% graduated from secondary school; 70% identified as White, 6% as Black,
2

For further details on the study, see Jacques 2019; Jacques et al. 2016. The study was approved by the
fieldworker’s Institutional Review Board.

and 24% other; 40% immigrated to the Netherlands; 56% and 30% reported daily use of
cannabis and alcohol, respectively. Participants provided information on traits of all personnel
of their coffeeshop, as well. On average, 67% are male; 15% married; 81% White; and, 47%
immigrants. On average at coffeeshops, there is one owner; one manager; five dealers who
focus on selling cannabis but may also serve drink and food; two servers who only serve the
latter; a runner who brings the cannabis stock; and, sometimes another dedicated employee,
such as a cleaner or a doorman.
During each interview, the goal was to obtain data about the coffeeshop’s prevention
of victimization, experiences with it, and responses. Interviews followed a semi-structured
protocol that promoted consistency in what was discussed across participants, while allowing
unplanned follow-up questions to elicit further details. Of course, some participants may have
lied or otherwise said something not reflecting the ‘truth’ (cf. Presser and Sandberg 2015;
Bernasco 2010). The fieldworker countered this problem by asking clarification questions,
promising confidentiality, and informing participants of their rights as a research subject.
Interviews took place in English because the fieldworker is only fluent in it. This language
barrier did not preclude any personnel from participating, as all exhibited fluency in English.
Interviews lasted between one and two hours, were audio-recorded, and transcribed
verbatim. Of the 50 interviewees, seven declined to be recorded and one conversation was
conducted in a place too loud to be recorded; instead, the fieldworker took detailed notes.
Using NVivo 10, a qualitative, software package, files were coded with identification tags
corresponding to relevant research issues. Initial tags were generally broad. One of these was
information related to police mobilization. The first and second authors sifted through the data
to create narrower distinctions. Emergent categories were personnel’s perceptions of the
potential benefits and costs of mobilizing police when victimized. The final coding step
involved detailed analysis of variance across cases, the results are presented, below.
Coffeeshop Personnel’s Rational Reasons for (Not) Mobilizing Police

Potential Benefits
When victimized, coffeeshop personnel implicitly or explicitly considered the utility –
benefits minus costs – of mobilizing police. We begin our analysis with the potential benefits.
Like most any victim, personnel weighed whether the police would be willing and able to
pursue justice. For example, when Hassan was asked if he called the police after €400 was
stolen out of the register, he answered: ‘No, I didn’t because he [the thief] was gone. If you
call them they are going to see the camera and that’s it. They are not going to do shit, believe
me. It’s going to get reported, that’s the only thing [that will result]. It’s only giving me extra
work, extra headache for nothing.’
Hanna described a less serious crime, handled the same way for the same reason. A
thief posed as a customer, but ran off with the marijuana when it came into his grasp. In
response, Hanna merely made an accounting note of the loss: ‘[I] put it on a list: minus 1
[gram, worth about €10]’ (on accounting in coffeeshops, see Jacques 2019). She did mobilize
police ‘because there wouldn’t be anything that they could do.’ The fieldworker followed-up
with the question, ‘And that’s all it comes down to, so if they could do something about it
would you?’ Her answer was, ‘Yeah, of course’.
In addition to whether police could do anything, personnel assessed whether they
would do anything. Negative assessments often pertained to the crime low seriousness. Maud
had trouble getting a rule-breaker to leave, making the person a trespasser. Asked about
requesting help from the police, she stated: ‘I would not call the police because I would not
want to make a big issue just about someone who does not want to go outside. It’s a small
problem. If it is a bigger problem then yes, I will call the police.’
Victims’ culpability also shaped their perception of what the police would do if called
on. This effect was discussed with Jack, for instance. He detailed an incident in which his
careless surveillance allowed a ‘German bastard’ to leave without paying for €100 of
marijuana. Posed the question about mobilizing police, he said: ‘For the police to even bother
investigating it would be a miracle. They would be like, “Ah, you are a muppet!” That is what
they would say to me, effectively. “That’s your fault for being stupid!” So it didn’t even cross
my mind to report it to the police.’
Personnel did not always deem the benefits of police mobilization as too low to
warrant it. This came up was with respect to tax write-offs and insurance claims. This
rationale was made possible by the Dutch coffeeshop policy’s treatment of coffeeshops as
above-ground, instead of underground, businesses. Coffeeshops pay income and corporate

taxes, though not VAT, to Dutch authorities, resulting in significant revenue for the
government (MacCoun 2011).
A common refrain among personnel was about taxes. Not so much about being owed,
but how it was enforced. Finn said of the tax-collector, ‘They are never satisfied. They want
to know every gram that is being bought, every gram that is being sold by name, by
whatever.’ Irman described what this looks like: ‘The tax people, they check the cash
machine; how much you sold for that day; what average to make the plan for the week, for the
month or the year; see how much tax you are paying.’ As with any legal business (or any
criminal, for that matter), not paying one’s taxes is a risk. So coffeeshops take steps to make
sure they do. ‘Everything [pertinent to accounting] is automated, recorded, and audited. I
think he [the owner] has had tax problems, before but not now’, James explained.
Paying taxes has its advantages, though. When victimized, coffeeshops could turn this
obligation into a benefit. Victor, for instance, was asked whether personnel at his coffeeshop
were willing to report victimizations to the police; he responded: ‘Shops pay taxes like
everybody else. They pay tax on what they sell. Coffeeshops pay taxes, so they are going to
report it, hell yeah.’
In addition to tax write-offs were insurance claims. Coffeeshops acquire insurance and
pay the premiums as a hedge on risk. To file a claim, it is often necessary to make a formal
report, which insurance companies require to cut-down on false payouts. So, after a burglary
at Maikel’s coffeeshop, in which about €700 worth of marijuana was stolen, he made a police
report because ‘I am insured, the shop is insured.’ Mike detailed the logic of involving the
police after his coffeeshop was robbed of more than €1,000 in cash and about 430 grams of
cannabis: ‘You have to do it. It is basically for insurance. I know for sure they [the owners]
have insurance for robbery: Like you get robbed for something, and they [the insurer] give
you the money back.’

Potential Costs
Coffeeshops’ tax obligations posed a risk to mobilizing police, as well, which brings
us our analysis to the potential costs of mobilizing police. Tips are a cultural phenomenon; in
some places they are expected (as at restaurants in the United States), in others unexpected.
They were the latter in Dutch coffeeshops, but, largely thanks to American visitors and small
change, were occasionally received. To collect this incentive, coffeeshops would put ‘tip jars’
on the counter, in full reach of any customer – and equally accessible to thieves. This is poor

crime prevention, no doubt, but it was done to avoid problems with the tax authorities; as
Lizzie explained:
I cannot put it [tips] in the register because if the tax people come, I have €10 extra in
the register, then they think I might do something on the side or something [such as
selling my own cannabis3]. Everyone always thinks first that you do criminal things.
When the police come to check the tax people also come and ask you everything, they
will do your administration and then the money has to be correct.
Because tips went largely unreported on personnel’s income tax filings, they feared
the ramifications of involving police when stolen. In Dean’s words: ‘Yes, they [people] steal
the tip jar. Yeah, this happened one time.’ Asked if it was reported to police, he answered,
‘They [personnel working at the time time] have to be secretive. Otherwise, we get in trouble
with the tax office.’ The fieldworker followed up with, ‘What would cause problems with the
taxes – the tip jar?’ He responded, ‘Well, the really legal way if you make a little bit more
money [is] you have to declare it. No one does, but in every business, like the casino they
have to do it also. That’s why it is a little bit awkward to talk about it.’
To here, the discussion on the potential benefits and costs is applicable to victims
everywhere, criminal and law-abiding. Coffeeshop personnel do, however, have unique
considerations. Their assessment to mobilize police was shaped by how it could interact with
the rules governing coffeeshops. The effect could be direct or indirect.
Potentially, a direct cost of calling the police when victimized is that on arrival, they
discover, record, and sanction a violation. Linda, in response to being asked if the police
provide the same protection to coffeeshops and bars, answered, ‘I do know they [coffeeshops]
are less keen on reporting to them.’ Probed for a reason, she alluded to the risk that police
detect a rule violation while investigating the victimization: ‘If they come in and they find
hard drugs [then we are in trouble]. I think they [police] watch you more as in a Big Brother
thing [which is why coffeeshops are less apt to mobilize them].’ She added, ‘Speaking for the
company I work for, we just try to do everything according to the rules.’
When coffeeshop personnel did mobilize police, police seemed less quick to help them
than bars. Talking about whether the police do a good job, Jens stated: ‘Usually, but it
depends. They respond quickly to bars; coffeeshops, they are usually a little bit lax [about
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See, for example, Jacques 2019.

providing swift assistance]. Sometimes it can be real shit for me when I am working, and so
sometimes you really do have to be dependent on the police and, yeah, they do seem to
respond quicker to bars than to coffeeshops – that’s a fact.’
A potential indirect cost of mobilizing police, when victimized, is putting the
coffeeshop in hot water by tarnishing its reputation for rule compliance. Jack worried that
reporting victimization would jeopardize the coffeeshop’s standing with police. The same
concern also motivated him not to aggressively handle the incident, as even self-defense could
be interpreted as violating the ban on nuisance:

The less you have the police over for an incident like that [the better]. It is kind of a
bad mark on the coffeeshop, even though it is not our fault. If I had started a fight
there [or something to handle the offender,] it would go on our records that there has
been an incident in the coffeeshop; violence had occurred and if I had thrown the first
punch. That would stand on their records, so we have to be very wary of all that.

Jack and his coffeeshop also serve as a good example of within-coffeeshop variation
in mobilizing police. Above, he presents reasons not to involve police, whereas, below, he
implies how rule compliance provides a safety net for their involvement. To contextualize that
observation, it is important to realize that coffeeshops vary in respectability. As with
individual offenders, individual coffeeshops vary in respectability. It is higher, by definition,
at a coffeeshop that takes more steps to prevent violations; has fewer of them, of a less serious
nature; and, been punished less often and less severely.
Getting back to Jack, he alludes to how the coffeeshop’s respectability mitigated the
risk of mobilizing police, making its potential benefit outweigh the potential cost:

If I needed to call the police, I would call them. If we need to ask advice, we will ask
them. As much as the authorities do consider us criminal enterprises, the police do
their best to work with us. As long as we can stay in line with them [with respect to
the coffeeshop rules], we can count on them not treating us like gangsters. [For
example,] when I have a problem like 15 nutters about to start a riot in my coffeeshop,
I can call on them [police] for help and they will come running. They will come and
help us. They don’t mess around. If we ask for their help they come quick.

Coffeeshops with more respectability have more access to law, at least in theory
(Black, 1976). Ergo, they should be more likely to mobilize police and receive better service.
To the extent that the average coffeeshop is higher in respectability, the average utility of
mobilizing police should increase. Because Dutch coffeeshop policy weeds out bad
coffeeshops by closing persistent and serious violators, it is logical that, as time goes on, the
average coffeeshop becomes more respectable. Gijs reflected on this possibility:

I have a feeling that it is getting better, like over the last thirty years since I have been
dealing. Yeah, I have seen robberies, I have seen things like that happening. So I think
with the coffeeshop, in the old days it was more like, “Ok, we have a space, we have a
bar, we have hash so let’s sell.” The book keeping was not always totally right, tax
paying. But nowadays everything gets [properly] arranged [nowadays]. I mean it’s a
totally legitimate business. Because of all these rules, and maybe the contact with the
police, crimes [by coffeeshops] have become a little bit less. I do have a feeling that it
has changed for the good.

Discussion
Coffeeshops are a peculiar kind of drug dealer. Their retail sales are de jure prohibited
by de jure legal, contingent on compliance with a set of government rules. Before
summarizing how that uniqueness affects their mobilization of police in response to
victimization, we reiterate how coffeeshop personnel are like many other victims: First, they
considered the potential benefits of the formal path. Its prospect was partly contingent on
perceptions of officers’ willingness and ability to seek justice. That assessment reflects the
crime’s characteristics and circumstances, such as its seriousness, the likelihood of
apprehending the offender, and the victim’s culpability. If justice was unlikely to be done, it
was a waste of personnel’s resources (e.g., time and effort) to mobilize police. An exception
was found with personnel who involved the police simply to get an official report. Though
formal justice may fall short, the report enabled coffeeshops to write-off the loss on their
taxes or to file an insurance claim (outside coffeeshops, see Goudriaan et al. 2004). Yet taxes
became a liability when tips were stolen, the worry being that a police report could
inadvertently lead to trouble with the tax authorities.
Other considerations of personnel were unique to working in a coffeeshop. They
expressed being ‘less keen’ to involve the police than are neighboring bar personnel (but see

Jacques et al. 2016), and, when police assistance was requested, as receiving less good
service. The latter perception may lead to the former, but, more so, personnel discussed the
potential cost of inviting police to their door. The risk stemmed from the possibility that on
arrival, the police would discover a rule violation, which, in turn, would lead to negative
consequences for the victim. The consequence could be a damaged reputation or, more
concretely, short- to term-closure or even criminal prosecution.
Potentially, that sequence of events – from victim to complainant to offender – could
be tied to any of the rules. Recall that on the premise, there cannot be hard drugs, persons
under 18 years of age, or more 500 grams of cannabis; and, a coffeeshop cannot sell more
than 5 grams to an individual in a day, advertise, or be a source of nuisance. So, for example,
when called to the scene of a victimization, police could walk into a coffeeshop and observe a
violation in plain sight, such as hard drugs that had been dropped on the floor (see, e.g.,
Linda’s quote). Or, police could blame the victim for the offense, take issue with the selfdefense (e.g., Jack’s quote), or construe the crime as nuisance – a rather vague concept in the
Dutch coffeeshop policy (Jacques 2019; Ooyen-Houben and Kleemans 2015).
In a word, the rules governing coffeeshops seem to deter personnel from reporting
victimization to police. This deterrence is not absolute, but rather restrictive. ‘Absolute
deterrence’ refers to cases in which fear stops an actor from ever committing an act. With
‘restrictive deterrence’, the non-commission is partial (Gibbs 1975; Jacobs 1993, 1996;
Jacques and Allen 2014; Moeller, Copes and Hochstetler 2016). In the criminological
literature, deterrence and those subtypes are used to explain crime. Yet it makes equal sense to
use them with respect to victims’ mobilization of police, so long as their fear is the causal
mechanism. Sometimes, personnel fear that mobilizing police will cause trouble for the
coffeeshop, so they forgo that path.
We do not want to overstate the uniqueness of coffeeshops, in the above analysis. It is
true that sellers of legal drugs are often regulated and, in theory, they may fear that involving
the police will result in a violation being detected by them.4 Bars in the study area, for
instance, were prohibited from, and punishable for, being a source of nuisance, having hard
drugs on the premise, or selling to underage persons. 5 However, those establishments are
subject to fewer rules than coffeeshops; not subject to mandatory police checks; and, closure
4

Also, dealers of fully prohibited drugs refrain from mobilizing police to prevent apprehension and punishment,
though are known to involve police if the cost-benefit balance is right (Jacques and Wright 2013; among
criminals generally, see Rosenfeld et al. 2003; Topalli 2005).
5
Specifically, bars cold not sell alcoholic beverages to persons 16 of age or younger, or drinks over 15% alcohol
to person under 18 years of age.

for violations is rare (Jacques et al. 2016). Our conjecture, based on the fieldworker’s
experience, is that bar personnel have very little to fear and, therefore, that factor is unlikely
to deter them from mobilizing police. Thus, while prior research shows that victimized bars
and coffeeshops have similar rates of police mobilization, our findings suggest that they likely
have some different motivations.
That assertion requires validation in future research, such as by analyzing bar
personnel’s explanations of why they did (not) mobilize police. It would also be useful to
know if they share the assessment, voiced by coffeeshop personnel, that bars are more apt to
involve police and receive better service from them. On top of that, the perspective of police
officers would be very useful, too (see, e.g., Spicer 2019). Those possibilities speak to a
limitation of this article: Its focus on a particular type of dealer, operating in a distinct locale,
in a particular time period: coffeeshops, in and around Amsterdam’s Red Light District, circa
2010. To be clear, those businesses are not only internationally unique, but also domestically
owing to their location. Plus, the Dutch drug landscape is constantly evolving, with much
changing in the country and study area post data-collection (Bieleman et al. 2015; Marie and
Zölitz 2017). Unknown is the extent to which our findings generalize to other dealers. That
problem applies not only to Dutch coffeeshops across time and place, but also to other kinds
of semi-illegal dealers (e.g., dispensaries in US states); sellers of previously outlawed but now
legal drugs (e.g., as with cannabis in Canada); and, those of drugs that have long been legal
(e.g., alcohol in Europe).
Another limitation is the sole theoretical focus on cost-benefit assessment. Certainly,
there are other influences on how coffeeshop personnel, and victims generally, decide (not) to
mobilize police. For example, we left unexamined how victims’ perceptions of police’s
legitimacy – a function of their perceived performance and fairness – affects the willingness
to mobilize them (see Tyler 2003). Other variables likely to bound rationality are sociocultural, informational, and emotional and emotional (Cornish and Clarke 1986; Kahneman
and Tversky 1972; Moeller 2018). These factors are ripe for inquiry in future studies.

Implications
The article’s findings and limitations lead to interesting questions about its
implications for drug control, and control more broadly. Let us begin with the latter. Our
study contributes to the knowledge of ‘regulating crime’ (Braithwaite 2000; Clarke 2018;
Freilich and Newman 2018), especially at micro-places (Eck and Eck 2012). The rationale for
the place-based regulation is to shift responsibility from government authorities onto others.

Governing at a distance is a growing issue of importance for criminology (Braithwaite 2000).
Dutch coffeeshop policy is effective at reducing various harms, including those attributable to
interpersonal crimes, yet that effect will appear bigger than it is if personnel are choosing not
to involve police when victimization, due to fear of the consequences. In Gill’s (2002)
terminology, this is a knowledge problem for regulators. But personnel have a knowledge
problem, too. They worry but cannot confirm that, one, police keep special tabs on perceived
trouble-spots and, two, reporting victimization to police risks being identified as such a spot.
This is an example of regulation’s ambiguity in enforcement. Regulators seek compliance, but
the process behind that is opaque, perhaps intentionally (Gill 2002; Hawkins 1998). Certainty
is a double-edge sword, as it can deter actions, but it also provides information useful to
evading detection. Uncertainty, then, is a friend and foe of control. Maximally effective
regulatory enforcement should not be fully transparent or mysterious, but somewhere in
between so as to keep regulated parties on their toes and in compliance.
With respect to drug control, more specifically, our findings shed new light on the
debate about what is the optimal form and amount (for other recent insights, see Coomber et
al. 2019; Spicer 2019). It is difficult to argue against harm reduction (Bacon 2016), first
formulated by Bentham (1970) and now a staple of worldwide calls to promote happiness and
minimize pain. Based on our findings, it could be interpreted that the rules governing
coffeeshops have the unintended, negative consequence of harming criminal justice by
deterring personnel from mobilizing police. Tying back to the article’s opening, this effect has
knock-on harms, such as contributing to the dark figure of crime and suboptimal allocation of
resources. Furthermore, the non-reporting of victimization may skew interpretations of Dutch
coffeeshop policy’s effectiveness, making it more difficult to compare to the alternatives (see
MacCoun and Reuter 2001).
An alternative interpretation, also evident in the data, is that part of why coffeeshops
obey the rules is to keep the door open to mobilizing police as needed. To break the rules
would make coffeeshops entirely on their own when victimized, unable to use anything but
informal means to seek justice. Personnel may realize that, one day, they may have no better
option than to involve police. Plausibly, then, coffeeshops’ compliance with the rules is partly
motivated by its payoff in access to law. Dutch policy allows coffeeshops to sell cannabis in
order to reduce the harms of hard drugs, and it may also be that coffeeshops follow the rules
to reduce the harms that would result from ‘virtual anarchy’ (Cooney 1998). This is an
example of adversaries becoming allies. In criminology, perhaps the best known example is

that of criminals-turned-informants in exchange for leniency or immunity from police and
prosecutors, with some even being rewarded financially (Natapoff 2011).
Dutch policy could take that a step further by making a new rule: When a
victimization occurs at a coffeeshop, its personnel must mobilize police. For practical reasons,
it would likely be wise to restrict the rule to certain types of offenses, such as violence or theft
and destruction exceeding a certain monetary amount. Noncompliance, as with the other
results, could result in punishment. This rule would further stretch police resources and may
be perceived as illegitimate, among other potential costs. Likely benefits are reducing the dark
figure of crime and related harms. The police would gain a better sense of which coffeeshops
are the biggest problem, and so be better positioned to take appropriate action. That could
further motivate coffeeshop personnel to prevent problems, out of fear that mobilizing police
is a knock against their respectability and so a risk to their licensure. This would be a new
source of proterrence, further scaring personnel into stopping non-personnel from committing
prohibited acts.
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